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ELIDING IN NEW YORK†
MONTE NEIL STEWART*

elision, noun . . . . The act or an instance of omitting something.1
2
elide, verb . . . . To eliminate or leave out of consideration.
3
In January 2006, this Journal published an article that set forth the
social institutional argument for man/woman marriage, demonstrated
how that argument is a sufficient response to all constitutional attacks
leveled at the laws sustaining that social institution, and detailed how
the courts mandating genderless marriage (and the dissenting judges
favoring that result) had elided the argument (“the Judicial Elision
article”). Since the Judicial Elision article’s early December 2005 cutoff date, two more instances of judicial elision of social institutional
realities have cropped up in New York. Both are dissenting opinions,
one in the Appellate Division and one in the Court of Appeals. Because
those dissenting opinions are interesting, and engagement with them
intellectually productive, this article critically examines both. In
preparation for doing so, and as an aid to the reader, this article also
summarizes central aspects of the social institutional argument as set
forth in the Judicial Elision article.

†

This article was also published as 1 DUKE J. CONST. LAW & PUB. POL’Y 221 (2006).
© Monte Neil Stewart, 2006. I thank Bill Duncan, Andrea Pace, Spencer Hall, Joel
Blickenstaff, Wendy Woodfield, and Tom Schofield for their valuable assistance in the
preparation of this article. Portions of this article were presented at the "Marriage Debates"
Conference at the University of California, Los Angeles *Apr. 21, 2006). This article is also
available on-line at www.manwomanmarriage.org.
1. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2000).
2. Id.
3. Monte Neil Stewart, Genderless Marriage, Institutional Realities, and Judicial Elision, 1
DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 1 (2006).
*
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I. A CONCISE SUMMARY OF THE SOCIAL INSTITUTIONAL
ARGUMENT
It has been called, cleverly but aptly, “The War of the Ring.”4 It is
being waged all across the public square, but the hottest and most
consequential battles are in the courts. On one side are those who
want marriage legally redefined to “the union of any two persons,”
with the law treating the parties’ gender as irrelevant to the civil
meaning of marriage—hence, genderless marriage. On the other side
are those who want to preserve “the union of a man and a woman” as
a core meaning of the marriage institution—hence, man/woman
marriage.
The social institutional argument is emerging as the clearest and
strongest explication of society’s (and, hence, government’s)
compelling interests in man/woman marriage. Before summarizing
that argument, however, certain of its extraordinary aspects merit
note.
Each building block in the argument is uncontroversial. Virtually
all serious students of social institutions accept the validity of the
understandings comprising it.5
To date, the argument remains unrefuted. The appellate courts
that have mandated genderless marriage (in Massachusetts and
Canada), in order to reach that result, ignored or otherwise evaded
the argument, and these courts’ elision of the argument is now well
6
demonstrated in the scholarly literature. In contrast, the courts that
have engaged the argument have rejected genderless marriage.7
Likewise, none of the serious legal scholars supporting genderless
8
marriage have genuinely engaged and countered the argument.
9
The argument fully qualifies as Rawlsian “public reason” and
satisfies even Linda McClain’s high standard: “The requirements of

4. Daniel Cere, The War of the Ring, in DIVORCING MARRIAGE: UNVEILING THE
DANGERS IN CANADA'S NEW SOCIAL EXPERIMENT 9 (Daniel Cere & Douglas Farrow eds.,
2004) [hereinafter Divorcing Marriage].
5. Stewart, supra note 3, at 8–27.
6. Id. at 28–60.
7. E.g., Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005); id. at 275–78
(Parrillo, J., concurring); see also Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 983–1005
(Mass. 2003) (Cordy, J., dissenting).
8. Stewart, supra note 3, at 60–77.
9. E.g., John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 765 (1997).
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public reason would . . . require the delineation of precisely how
same-sex marriages threaten the institution of marriage in terms of
10
public reasons and political values implicit in our public culture.”
This achievement of the social institutional argument merits emphasis
exactly because of what Margaret Somerville has accurately observed:
One strategy used by same-sex marriage advocates is to label all
people who oppose same-sex marriage as doing so for religious or
moral reasons in order to dismiss them and their arguments as
irrelevant to public policy. [Further,] good secular reasons to
oppose same-sex marriage are re-characterized as religious or as
based on personal morality and, therefore, as not applicable at a
11
societal level.

Because the argument demonstrates that adoption of genderless
marriage will necessarily de-institutionalize man/woman marriage,
and thereby cause the loss of its unique social goods, the argument
effectively refutes the notion that the proponents of man/woman
marriage have only one “real” motive: animus towards gay men and
lesbians.12
Because the argument demonstrates society’s (and hence the
government’s) compelling interests in preserving the vital social
institution of man/woman marriage, the argument is a sufficient
response to all constitutional challenges leveled at the laws sustaining
that institution, and that is so regardless of what standard of review
the court applies.13

10. Linda C. McClain, Deliberative Democracy, Overlapping Consensus, and Same-Sex
Marriage, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1241, 1251 (1998).
11. Margaret Somerville, What About the Children?, in DIVORCING MARRIAGE, supra
note 4, at 70–71. She goes on to note that these tactics "do not serve the best interests of either
individuals or society in this debate." Id. at 71.
12. See, e.g., Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 968 ("The absence of any reasonable relationship
between, on the one hand, an absolute disqualification of same-sex couples who wish to enter
into civil marriage and, on the other, protection of public health, safety, or general welfare,
suggests that the marriage restriction is rooted in persistent prejudices against persons who are
(or who are believed to be) homosexual."); Editorial, For Gay Marriage, Boston Globe, July 8,
2003, at A18 ("For all the legal acrobatics offered by opponents, it is hard to see how anything
other than an animus toward gays and lesbians prevents them from obtaining the same 'benefits
and protections' enjoyed by heterosexual couples."); GAY & LESBIAN ADVOCATES &
DEFENDERS, IS DOMA DOOMED?: THE FEDERAL "DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT" AND
STATE ANTI-GAY, ANTI-MARRIAGE LAWS 13 (2001), available at http://www.glad.org/rights/
IsDOMADoomed.pdf ("DOMA's sheer breadth and its lack of any connection to a legitimate
legislative end demonstrates that it can only be explained by anti-gay animus.").
13. Stewart, supra note 3, at 27–28.
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The social institutional argument for man/woman marriage is a
14
sufficient response because of what it succeeds in demonstrating. It
demonstrates that marriage, like all social institutions, is constituted
by a web of shared public meanings; that these meanings teach, form,
and transform individuals, providing identities, purposes, and projects;
and that in this way, these meanings provide vital social goods. Across
time and cultures, a core meaning constitutive of the marriage
institution has virtually always been the union of a man and a woman.
This core man/woman meaning is powerful and even indispensable
for the marriage institution’s production of at least six of its valuable
social goods. The man/woman marriage institution is:
Society’s best and probably only effective means to make real the
right of a child to know and be brought up by his or her biological
parents (with exceptions justified only in the best interests of the
child, not those of any adult).
The most effective means humankind has developed to maximize
the private welfare provided to children conceived by passionate,
heterosexual coupling (with “private welfare” meaning not just the
basic requirements like food and shelter but also education, play,
work, discipline, love, and respect).
The indispensable foundation for that child-rearing mode—that is,
married mother/father child-rearing—that correlates (in ways not
subject to reasonable dispute) with the optimal outcomes deemed
crucial for a child’s—and therefore society’s—well being.
Society’s primary and most effective means of bridging the malefemale divide.
Society’s only means of conferring the identity of, and
transforming, a male into husband/father and a female into
wife/mother statuses and identities particularly beneficial to society.
Social and official endorsement of that form of adult intimacy—
married heterosexual intercourse—that society may rationally value
above all other such forms. That rationality has been demonstrated in
the scholarly literature and remains, to date, unrefuted.
The social institutional argument further demonstrates that, with
its power to suppress social meanings, the law can radically change

14. Because the remainder of this section is a summary of the Judicial Elision article,
Stewart, supra note 3, it is presented without further footnoting.
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and even deinstitutionalize man/woman marriage, with concomitant
loss of the institution’s social goods. Further, genderless marriage is a
radically different institution than man/woman marriage, as evidenced
by the large divergence in the nature of their respective social goods
(in the case of genderless marriage, only promised, not yet delivered).
Indeed, observers of marriage who are both rigorous and wellinformed regarding the realities of social institutions uniformly
acknowledge the magnitude of the differences between the two
possible institutions of marriage, and this is so regardless of the
observer’s own sexual, political, or theoretical orientation or
preference.
Another social institutional reality is that a society can have, at
any one time, only one social institution denominated marriage. That
is because a society, as a simple matter of reality, cannot, at one and
the same time, have as shared, core, constitutive meanings of the
marriage institution “the union of a man and a woman” and “the
union of any two persons.” A society, as a simple matter of reality,
cannot, at one and the same time, tell people, and especially children,
that marriage means “the union of a man and a woman” and “the
union of any two persons.” The one meaning necessarily displaces the
other. Hence, every society must choose either to retain the old
man/woman marriage institution or, by force of law, to suppress it and
put in its place the radically different genderless marriage institution.
But to suppress, by force of “constitutional” law no less, the shared
public meanings constituting the old institution is to lose the valuable
social goods flowing from those institutionalized meanings. Thus, the
social institutional argument refutes the “no-downside” argument
advanced by genderless marriage proponents and seen in the famous
tactic of asking: “How will letting Jim and John marry hurt Monte’s
and Anne’s marriage?”
These social institutional realities further reveal phrases like gay
marriage or same-sex marriage to be misleading. These phrases get
people thinking that a society will keep its old kind of marriage and
just get a new and separate kind. But that is not so because of the
social institutional realities just reviewed; a society can have one or
the other but never at the same time both possible kinds of civil
marriage. And after a judicial decree of genderless marriage, made in
the name of constitutional norms of equality, liberty, dignity, or
autonomy, an American state will certainly not be the happy home of
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many different marriage norm communities, each doing its own
marriage thing, each equally valid before the law, and each equally
secure in its own space. Rather, that state will have one marriage
norm community (genderless marriage) officially sanctioned and
officially protected; all other marriage norm communities will be
officially constrained, officially disdained, and sharply curtailed.
Moreover, there are profound problems with the notion that
supporters of the old marriage institution can, if they want, just
huddle together in some linguistic, social, or religious enclave to
preserve the old institution and its meanings. Social institutional
studies teach that the dominant society and its language and meanings
will, like an ocean and its waves, inevitably wear down and cause to
disappear any island enclave of an opposing norm. To the degree that
members of the enclave were to adopt the speech of the dominant
society, they would lose the power to name, and in large part the
power to discern, what once mattered to their forbears. To that
degree, their forbears’ ways would seem implausible to them, and
probably even unintelligible.
II. THE NEW YORK GENDERLESS MARRIAGE LITIGATION
In New York, genderless marriage proponents prosecuted five
different civil actions in five different state trial courts.15 In each
action, the claim was that the state constitution required that marriage
be redefined from the union of a man and a woman to the union of
any two persons.16 Four trial courts rejected the claim17 (and garnered

15. Hernandez v. Robles, 794 N.Y.S.2d 579 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005); Kane v. Marsolais, Index
No. 3473-04 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005) (unpublished); Samuels v. N.Y. State Dep't of Health, Index
No. 1967-04 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004) (unpublished); Seymour v. Holcomb, 790 N.Y.S.2d 858 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2005); Shields v. Madigan, 783 N.Y.S.2d 270 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004).
16. The organizations supporting these and similar state court actions across the country
are united in a firm resolve that the definition-of-marriage issue not be raised now or in the
foreseeable future, whether in state or federal court, as a federal constitutional claim. This
resolve is based on the organizations' judgment that for now and in the foreseeable future the
federal courts, including the United States Supreme Court, will reject such a federal genderless
marriage claim. Maverick lawyers and plaintiffs (that is, those not acting under the control of
these organizations) have nevertheless made the federal claim three times, losing twice in
federal district court and once in federal bankruptcy court. Smelt v. Orange County, 374 F.
Supp. 2d 861 (C.D. Cal. 2005); Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (M.D. Fla. 2005); In re
Kandu, 315 B.R. 123, 137–38 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004). The losing lawyer and plaintiffs in the
Florida federal action initially vowed publicly to appeal the adverse decision all the way to the
Supreme Court but subsequently bowed to organizational pressure in foregoing any appeal.
When the losing lawyer and plaintiffs in the California federal action did not bow to similar

DO NOT DELETE

2006]

12/30/2008 12:11:46 PM

ELIDING IN NEW YORK

43
18

little media attention), while one, in the case of Hernandez v. Robles
in the Borough of Manhattan, accepted the claim (and garnered
massive media attention). On appeal, the Third Department of the
Appellate Division, by a 5-0 vote, affirmed three of the four trial court
decisions in favor of man/woman marriage;19 the fourth is still pending
before the Second Department.20 The First Department, with a three21
22
judge majority opinion and a one-judge concurring opinion,
reversed the trial court decision in Hernandez. One judge, however,
dissented, arguing that the state constitution required the redefinition
23
of marriage. That dissenting opinion (“the AD dissenting opinion”)
is the first of the two that I examine.
All these Appellate Department decisions were appealed to the
Court of Appeals, the state’s highest court. On July 6, 2006, the Court
of Appeals, by a 4-to-2 vote, held that the state laws defining marriage
as the union of a man and a woman did not violate the New York
constitution.24 The court issued three opinions. Three justices joined
the plurality opinion.25 A fourth justice wrote a concurring opinion,
which one of the three in the plurality also joined.26 The chief justice’s
dissenting opinion was joined by one other justice (“the COA
27
dissenting opinion”). (The seventh justice had previously recused
himself.) Like the AD dissenting opinion, the COA dissenting opinion

pressure but pursued an appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, one of the organizations,
Equality California, moved to intervene before the Ninth Circuit to urge that the appeal be
dismissed on justiciability grounds. Opening Brief of Proposed Intervenor Equality California at
3, Smelt v. County of Orange, No. 05-56040 (9th Cir. 2005). The Ninth Circuit denied the
intervention motion but ultimately ruled as the proposed intervenor desired; that is, the court
avoided the federal constitutional issue by ordering dismissal on justiciability grounds. Smelt v.
County of Orange, 447 F.3d 673, 685–86 (9th Cir. 2006).
17. Kane, Index No. 3473-04; Samuels, Index No. 1967-04; Seymour, 790 N.Y.S.2d at 858;
Shields, 783 N.Y.S.2d at 270.
18. 794 N.Y.S.2d at 579.
19. Kane v. Marsolais, 808 N.Y.S.2d 566 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006); Samuels v. N.Y. State
Dep't of Health, 811 N.Y.S.2d 136 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006); Seymour v. Holcomb, 811 N.Y.S.2d
134 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006).
20. Shields v. Madigan, --- N.Y.S.2d --- (N.Y. App. Div. ----).
21. Hernandez v. Robles, 805 N.Y.S.2d 354 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005).
22. Id. at 363–77 (Catterson, J., concurring).
23. Id. at 377–89 (Saxe, J., dissenting).
24. Hernandez v. Robles, No. 86, 2006 WL 1835429 (N.Y. July 6, 2006).
25. Id. at *1–7.
26. Id. at *7–14 (Graffeo, J., concurring).
27. Id. at *14–23 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting).
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is also interesting and engagement with it intellectually productive.
Accordingly, I also examine it.
III. THE APPELLATE DEPARTMENT DISSENTING OPINION AND ITS
ELISIONS
In rejecting the state constitutional claim for genderless marriage,
the three-judge majority opinion and the one-judge concurring
opinion in Hernandez AD acknowledged fundamental aspects of the
social institutional argument; this occurred primarily by citation to
and approving quotation from28 Justice Cordy’s articulation of the
argument in Goodridge.29
With respect to the AD dissenting opinion, it is interesting that the
social institutional argument engages most points attempted by it. But
that is not to say that the AD dissenting opinion engages the social
institutional argument. Although the AD dissenting opinion uses the
word institution in connection with marriage twenty-one times, that
opinion, other than acknowledging that marriage is a valuable social
institution, otherwise ignores the social institutional argument. In
doing so, it makes assertions about the nature of the marriage
institution that appear to be rather clearly at odds with
understandings provided by social institutional studies.
A. The “Convenient False Assumption” Elision
An important aspect of the AD dissenting opinion is its bold use
of what may fairly be called the “convenient false assumption” elision.
Although positing the institutional nature of marriage and the
institution’s high value, the AD dissenting opinion proceeds
throughout on the assumption that the institution is not constituted
by its shared public meanings or, perhaps, on the more narrow
assumption that “the union of a man and a woman” is not now one of
those constitutive meanings or, perhaps, on the even more narrow
assumption that the man/woman meaning, although present, is not
productive of anything socially valuable.

28. Hernandez, 805 N.Y.S.2d at 360; id. at 375–76 (Catterson, J., concurring).
29. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 995–96 (Mass. 2003) (Cordy, J.,
dissenting).
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Regarding the broadest possible assumption explanatory of the
AD dissenting opinion’s performance, it is true that the opinion
nowhere acknowledges that social institutions of betterment are
constituted by shared public meanings, which in turn teach, form, and
transform individuals in ways productive of social goods valuable to
society. But the opinion nowhere expressly denies that particular and
uncontroversial social institutional reality. So, fairness seems to
dictate that the AD dissenting opinion not be taken to task for
proceeding on the broadest possible assumption.
Regarding the more narrow assumption, that the man/woman
meaning is not now constitutive of the marriage institution, the AD
dissenting opinion does make an explicit effort in that direction:
It is fair to say that both the law and the population generally now
view marriage, at least in the abstract ideal, as a partnership of
equals with equal rights, who have mutually joined to form a new
family unit, founded upon shared intimacy and mutual financial
and emotional support. . . . [T]he gender of the two partners to a
30
marriage is no longer critical to its definition.

The AD dissenting opinion then refers to this asserted model as “a
widely held view”31 of marriage and a bit later calls it “our current
32
understanding of the definition and purpose of marriage.”
What the AD dissenting opinion is doing here is asserting that
marriage is nothing more than a close personal relationship, meaning
a relationship stripped of any goal or end beyond the intrinsic
emotional, psychological, or sexual satisfaction that the relationship
33
brings to the two adults involved. But it has become clear that a
judge intent on redefining marriage through an equality argument
must assert, as the AD dissenting opinion does, that marriage is
nothing more than a close personal relationship.34 That is because to

30.
31.
32.
33.

Hernandez, 805 N.Y.S.2d at 381 (Saxe, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 382.
For an excellent summary of the close personal relationship model of marriage, see
DANIEL CERE, THE FUTURE OF FAMILY LAW: LAW AND THE MARRIAGE CRISIS IN NORTH
AMERICA 14–15 (Council on Family Law, 2005), available at http://www.marriagedebate.com/
pdf/future_of_family_law.pdf.
34. If the AD dissenting opinion were to assert (it clearly does not) that the close personal
relationship model is all that marriage "ought" to be, it would have distinguished company. That
"ought" is what drove the drafters of the American Law Institute's Principles of the Law of
Family Dissolution and, in Canada, the Law Commission's Beyond Conjugality: Recognizing
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reject that model because it is factually inadequate (that is, true as far
as it goes but going not nearly far enough) is to reject the equality
argument for genderless marriage. That is exactly what we see in the
35
court decisions sustaining the man/woman marriage institution. The
other side of the coin is that judicial acceptance of the close personal
relationship model’s accuracy and adequacy is the always-present
36
foundation for judicial acceptance of the equality argument. But, to
date, judicial acceptance of the close personal relationship model has
been an unexamined and unproven starting point of analysis, not the
37
result of thoughtful examination.
When the AD dissenting opinion asserts that the close personal
relationship model is now—after a process of evolution—all that
marriage is, it is just wrong as a matter of fact. Although it is not
wrong in some American communities or in portions of that world
created by Hollywood, it is wrong, on the ground, across New York
and the nation. The fundamental inadequacy in the descriptive power
of the close personal relationship model is recognized by the
Hernandez AD majority and the other courts and judges who have
actually and seriously examined that supposedly complete description
38
of marriage. Although the contemporary social institution of
marriage undoubtedly includes the “ideal” of “a partnership of equals
with equal rights, who have mutually joined to form a new family unit,
and Supporting Close Personal Adult Relationships. See CERE, supra note 33, at 16–20. But, of
course, there are competing social theories as to what marriage "ought" to be, both in the
academy and across the electorate, and at least since the time of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr., it has been considered bad judicial form to anoint, in the name of constitutional equality or
liberty or whatnot, one social theory and to suppress the competing social theories, especially
those embedded in democratically promulgated laws—like the state and federal "defense of
marriage" acts and constitutional amendments. Monte Neil Stewart, Judicial Redefinition of
Marriage, 21 CAN. J. FAM. L. 11, 95-99 (2004).
35. E.g., Hernandez, 805 N.Y.S.2d at 360; Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259, 276 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2005) (Parrillo, J., concurring) ("This distillation of marriage down to its pure
'close personal relationship' essence, however, strips the social institution 'of any goal or end
beyond the intrinsic emotional, psychological, or sexual satisfaction which the relationship
brings to the individuals involved. . . .' Yet, the marital form traditionally has embraced so much
more . . . .").
36. Stewart, supra note 34, at 97–98.
37. This obvious feature of cases such as Ontario's Halpern v. Toronto, [2003] D.L.R. 529,
and Massachusetts' Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003), has
led Douglas Farrow to label, and fairly so, their approach as "obviously circular, and viciously
so." Douglas Farrow, Rights and Recognition, in DIVORCING MARRIAGE, supra note 4, at
98–99. See also Stewart, supra note 34, at 95–99.
38. See, e.g, Hernandez, 805 N.Y.S.2d at 359–60; Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259, 275–76
(Parillo, J., concurring).
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founded upon shared intimacy and mutual financial and emotional
39
support,” enduring aspects of the institution go far beyond that
limited and limiting description of transformative meanings:
Conjugal marriage [i.e., man/woman marriage] has several
characteristics. First, it is inherently normative. Conjugal marriage
cannot celebrate an infinite array of sexual or intimate choices as
equally desirable or valid. Instead, its very purpose lies in
channeling the erotic and interpersonal impulses between men and
women in a particular direction: one in which men and women
commit to each other and to the children that their sexual unions
commonly (and even at times unexpectedly) produce.
As an institution, conjugal marriage addresses the social
problem that men and women are sexually attracted to each other
and that, without any outside guidance or social norms, these
intense attractions can cause immense personal and social damage.
. . . [Man/woman marriage] provides an evolving form of life that
helps men and women negotiate the sex divide, forge an intimate
community of life, and provide a stable social setting for their
children . . . .
Another characteristic of conjugal marriage is that it is
fundamentally child-centered, focused beyond the couple towards
the next generation. Not every married couple has or wants
children. But at its core marriage has always had something to do
with societies’ recognition of the fundamental importance of the
sexual ecology of human life: humanity is male and female, men
and woman often have sex, babies often result, and those babies,
on average, seem to do better when their mother and father
cooperate in their care. Conjugal marriage attempts to sustain
enduring bonds between women and men in order to give a baby
its mother and father, to bond them to one another and to the
40
baby.

39. Hernandez AD, 805 N.Y.S.2d at 381 (Saxe, J., dissenting).
40. CERE, supra note 4, at 12–13. Further descriptions of the meanings and purposes
inhering in contemporary man/woman marriage—meanings beyond those few comprising the
close personal relationship model—can be found. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 34, at 41–58;
Stewart, supra note 3, at 16–20; Maggie Gallagher, (How) Will Gay Marriage Weaken Marriage
as a Social Institution: A Reply to Andrew Koppelman, 2 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 33, 43–51 (2004);
and Maggie Gallagher, Does Sex Make Babies? Marriage, Same-Sex Marriage and Legal
Justifications for the Regulation of Intimacy in a Post-Lawrence World, 23 QUINNIPIAC L. REV.
447, 451–71 (2004).
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On this issue of “the union of a man and a woman” subsisting or
not as a core and constitutive meaning of the contemporary American
marriage institution, the AD dissenting opinion falters badly. That the
man/woman meaning is no longer a constituent of the contemporary
institution is, after all, an assertion of supposed fact—an is, not an
ought.41 And facts are stubborn things. The continuing force of that
meaning in the institution seems no less factual in the face of the AD
dissenting opinion’s bald assertions to the contrary. After all, those
assertions are just that, bald; they appear unsupported by proof of any
42
type. In contrast, proof is present that “the union of a man and
woman” continues as a strongly shared public meaning among the
complex of other meanings constitutive of the contemporary
institution. One such proof is the simple social fact that forty states
and the federal government, within just the past decade or so, have
enacted “defense of marriage” acts and/or constitutional amendments
expressing that shared meaning and declining to deviate from it in
cases of foreign genderless marriages.43 It bears repeating that these
laws are very recent social expressions, not the vestiges of “long44
accepted assumptions that . . . have eroded.” Moreover, there is this
reality:
[I]nstitutions are not worn out by continued use, but each use of
the institution is in a sense a renewal of that institution. Cars and
shirts wear out as we use them but constant use renews and
strengthens institutions such as marriage . . . . [I]n terms of the
continued collective intentionality of the users, each use of the
institution is a renewed expression of the commitment of the users
45
to the institution.

In 2004, nearly 4.5 million Americans made such an intentional
renewed expression of their commitment to the man/woman marriage
institution by marrying and thereby becoming a husband or a wife.46
41. See supra note 34.
42. Serious scholarship provides no supporting proof, although some popular literature
does. E.g., STEPHANIE COONTZ, MARRIAGE, A HISTORY: FROM OBEDIENCE TO INTIMACY, OR
HOW LOVE CONQUERED MARRIAGE (2005).
43. William C. Duncan, Marriage Amendments and the Reader in Bad Faith, 7 FLA.
COASTAL L. REV. 234, 234–35 nn.2, 3 (2005) (collecting citations to statutes and amendments
defining marriage as the union of a man and a woman).
44. Hernandez, 805 N.Y.S.2d at 381 (Saxe, J., dissenting).
45. JOHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 57 (1995).
46. The number of people who married in the United States in 2004 was 4,558,000.
Subtracting the people who married in Massachusetts (83,098), the number would be 4,474,902.
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Thus, it seems difficult to take seriously the AD dissenting opinion’s
apparent assumption that the man/woman meaning is not now
constitutive of the marriage institution across the nation, including
47
New York.
I turn now to the narrowest possible assumption explanatory of
the judicial performance reflected in the AD dissenting opinion: that
the man/woman meaning still constitutive of the marriage institution
is, quite simply, without value. But here again, unfortunately, the
opinion relies exclusively on bald assertions. It asserts: “It is marriage
itself, the institution by which two individuals join together to form a
family unit, that contains the virtues the state may legitimately seek to
protect. The traditional limitation of that institution to heterosexual
48
couples is not similarly valuable.” Furthermore, it states: “This
availability of the institution to opposite-sex couples neither
encourages opposite-sex couples to choose to marry, nor encourages
them to procreate only within marriage.”49
The judicial performance reflected in these assertions must be
adjudged at least disappointing because of the reliance on ipse dixit,
the resulting failure to marshal any supporting proof, and so forth.
The performance is disappointing most fundamentally because the
assertions are breathtakingly erroneous. In a rather straightforward
manner, the Judicial Elision article demonstrates how the man/woman
meaning is not just important but essential to the marriage
50
institution’s production of at least six valuable social goods. And the
assertion that the man/woman marriage institution is not effective in
encouraging “opposite-sex couples to choose to marry . . . [or] to
procreate only within marriage” is—if given a straightforward
reading—beyond the pale. Certainly, the institution is not completely
successful with those two social tasks, but to say (as the AD dissenting
opinion rather clearly seems to say) that the man/woman marriage
institution in this nation utterly fails with those two tasks is

Brady E. Hamilton et al., Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Births, Marriages, Divorces,
and Deaths: Provisional Data for 2004, 53 NAT’L VITAL STAT. REPORTS NO. 21, at 1, 6 (June
28, 2005), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr53/nvsr53_21.pdf.
47. Of course, the man/woman meaning is currently being suppressed in Massachusetts by
force of law. In those circumstances, the deinstitutionalization of man/woman marriage seems
likely to be accomplished sooner rather than later, absent a change in the law.
48. Hernandez, 805 N.Y.S.2d at 388 (Saxe, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 390.
50. Stewart, supra note 3, at 16–20.
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indefensible. A substantial majority of Americans choose to enter
51
man/woman marriage, and a substantial majority of American births
52
are legitimate.
The question arises whether the AD dissenting opinion really
intended to say that a social institution denominated marriage, but
devoid of the man/woman meaning, would be equally successful with
those two social tasks. If so, then the opinion is engaging in a
somewhat different elision of social institutional realities, one seen in
other parts of the opinion and fairly called the “institution-apartfrom-its-meanings” elision. I turn to that now.
B. The “Institution-Apart-From-Its-Meanings” Elision
The following is, rather clearly, central to the AD dissenting
opinion’s analysis: Substitution of the new constitutive meaning—“the
union of any two persons”—for the old meaning—“the union of a
man and a woman”—leaves the marriage institution the same for all
important purposes, with the corollary being that there is no “downside” to the substitution. Thus, the opinion denies that “allowing samesex couples to marry will have any effect on the continued survival of
the institution itself or even its ongoing vitality among heterosexuals.
Marriage remains . . . .”53 In the same vein, it rejects “the conclusion
that excluding same-sex couples from marrying will substantially
54
assist in achieving the protection of the institution generally.”
Further, it asserts: “It is marriage itself, the institution by which two
individuals join together to form a family unit, that contains the
virtues the state may legitimately seek to protect. The traditional
limitation of that institution to heterosexual couples is not similarly
valuable.”55
The social institutional argument demonstrates the problematic
nature of the AD dissenting opinion’s view of the matter. That

51. The National Marriage Project report for 2005 states, "[f]or the generation of 1995,
assuming a continuation of then current marriage rates, several demographers projected that 88
percent of women and 82 percent of men would ever marry." National Marriage Project, The
State of Our Unions 2005, at 16–17 (2005), http://marriage.rutgers.edu.
52. The births to married women in 2004 were 64.3 percent of all births. Brady E. Hamilton
et al., Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Births: Preliminary Data for 2004, 54 NAT’L
VITAL STAT. REPORTS NO. 8, at 3 (Dec. 29, 2005).
53. Hernandez, 805 N.Y.S.2d at 388 (Saxe, J., dissenting).
54. Id.
55. Id.
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argument demonstrates most fundamentally that institutional
meanings matter, that those meanings constitute the institution, and,
magnified by institutional power and influence, those meanings form
and transform individuals in ways productive of valuable social
56
goods. The argument further demonstrates that a “social institution
defined at its core as the union of any two persons is unmistakably
different from the historic marriage institution between a man and a
woman.”57 It also demonstrates that the profound difference between
the two possible marriage institutions is uniformly acknowledged by
“[o]bservers of marriage who are both rigorous and well informed
regarding the realities of social institutions” regardless of their own
“sexual, political, or theoretical orientation or preference.”58 In
addition, “the radical difference between the two possible marriage
institutions [is further evidenced by] . . . the profound difference in
social goods provided.”59 The argument further demonstrates that our
society or any society can, by force of law, choose and sustain one or
the other possible marriage institution but cannot have both at the
same time.60 Finally, for the law to set up the new institution and
suppress the old one is to assure the loss of the valuable social goods
uniquely provided by man/woman marriage. Although that loss may
not happen immediately, it will happen sooner rather than later.61
These social institutional realities rather thoroughly undermine
the AD dissenting opinion’s foundational notion that, for all purposes
that matter, the marriage institution will be unchanged regardless of
which of the two possible core meanings constitute it, “the union of
any two persons” or “the union of a man and a woman.” The AD
dissenting opinion’s analysis falters exactly because fundamentally
different meanings, when magnified by institutional power and
influence, do not produce the same social identities, aspirations,
projects, or ways of behaving. In other words, the man/woman
marriage institution will socially construct a people and hence a
society different from the people and society socially constructed by
the genderless marriage institution. It could not be otherwise because

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Stewart, supra note 3, at 8–10, 16–20.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 20 n.53.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 24–25.
Id. at 6.
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the genderless marriage institution is radically different in what it
aims for and in what it teaches. To say that the result will be otherwise
(as the AD dissenting opinion does) is to say that the core meanings
constitutive of powerful social institutions do not matter in the
formation and transformation of individuals, and no rational and
informed observer says that.
These social institutional realities also rather completely refute
the corollary that underpins the AD dissenting opinion’s analysis—
that society will lose nothing of value if it chooses (or has imposed on
it by judicial mandate) genderless marriage. That corollary is invalid
because, as has been demonstrated, the man/woman meaning is both a
constitutive core of the institution not just important but essential to
the institution’s production of a number of valuable social goods. To
lose the man/woman meaning must mean the loss of those goods,
which would seem to qualify as a very big “down-side” indeed.
C. The “Evolving Marriage Institution” Counter
The Judicial Elision article considered at length the “evolving
marriage institution” counter to the social institutional argument.62
The AD dissenting opinion uses that counter. Thus, “[t]he institution
63
of marriage has changed remarkably over the centuries,” and judicial
support for man/woman marriage now “fails to recognize the extent
to which the fundamental characteristics of the institution have
changed, and continue to change, over time.”64 The Hernandez
majority makes “a determined effort to avoid acknowledging these
fundamental changes in the institution of marriage as well as in our
society generally.”65
For the “evolving marriage institution” counter to carry the day
for genderless marriage, it must do one of two things. Either it must
show that the “evolution” has removed the constitutive meaning of
“the union of a man and a woman” from the contemporary marriage
66
institution so that the law’s task is simply to “adjust accordingly,” or
it must demonstrate that the change not yet (and maybe never to be)
62. Stewart, supra note 3, at 61–70.
63. Hernandez, 805 N.Y.S.2d at 381 (Saxe, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 381–82.
65. Id. at 382.
66. Id. at 381 ("As the institution of marriage has been redefined within modern American
society, the law has adjusted accordingly.").
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chosen or “evolved” by society is so wise that a court ought to impose
it on society by no less than the force of “constitutional” law. The AD
dissenting opinion makes neither showing. Its failure regarding the
first task is examined in the preceding subsections. Its failure to see its
own failure with that first task is apparently what prevents any
genuine effort toward the second task. But then, the best academic
advocates of the “evolving marriage institution” counter have likewise
failed with both tasks.67
As demonstrated in the Judicial Elision article, the arrival of
genderless marriage in North America is not the result of institutional
changes (evolution) resulting from forces other than the law; rather, it
68
is the result of law-mandated institutional change. “[I]t was EGALE,
Halpern, and Goodridge that switched the meaning of marriage at its
core, not society.”69 Nor has anyone yet demonstrated that the net
benefit (if any) to society from the imposition of genderless marriage
and the suppression of man/woman marriage is so great that
constitutional doctrine justifies such a judicially mandated change.
These two serious deficiencies in the “evolving marriage institution”
counter to the social institutional argument appear fatal to the
counter. In failing to engage or, apparently, even consider these
deficiencies, the judicial performance reflected in the AD dissenting
opinion disappoints, and not a little.70
D. A Pre-Political Institution and John Locke
The AD dissenting opinion’s opening words are intriguing: “Civil
marriage is an institution created by the state . . . .”71 Whether the state
created the marriage institution or whether, once the state emerged in
human society, it simply acted on or interacted with a pre-existing
marriage institution (hence, a “pre-political institution”) is the subject

67. See Stewart, supra note 3, at 61–70.
68. Id. at 63–64.
69. Id. at 64.
70. Another aspect of the AD dissenting opinion also implicates social institutional
understandings: the opinion deploys repeatedly the argument of the racial analogy, also known
as the argument of the Perez/Loving analogy. Hernandez, 805 N.Y.S.2d at 379–81, 381 n.3, 382
(Saxe, J., dissenting). Because the COA dissenting opinion does the same, that matter is
discussed infra in section IV.E.
71. Hernandez, 805 N.Y.S.2d at 377 (Saxe, J., dissenting).
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72
of some reflection and debate. With its opening words, the AD
dissenting opinion votes for the “state-created” conclusion. Joseph
Raz seems to best capture the more widely-supported view, using
language that describes state support for a pre-political institution:

Perfectionist political action may be taken in support of social
institutions which enjoy unanimous support in the community, in
order to give them formal recognition, bring legal and
administrative arrangements into line with them, facilitate their
use by members of the community who wish to do so, and
encourage the transmission of belief in their value to future
generations. In many countries this is the significance of the legal
recognition of monogamous marriage and prohibition of
73
polygamy.

In any event, the AD dissenting opinion, soon after boldly
asserting the “state-created” conclusion and apparently not aware of
the inconsistency, actually supports rather powerfully the contrary
conclusion. It does so by stating that “concepts of natural law that
pre-existed our constitution” were influentially advanced by “such
distinguished thinkers as . . . John Locke” and thereby became the
source of the contemporary constitutional notion of fundamental
rights, with one of those being the “fundamental right to marry.”74
That fundamental right, according to the AD dissenting opinion,
requires judicially-mandated genderless marriage.75 Yet Locke, like
other Enlightenment thinkers, appreciated the value of forms of social
order separate from the state, “institutions of civil society” or “civil
institutions,” that, in Locke’s view, included what he called “conjugal
76
society,” meaning marriage and family. Locke viewed conjugal

72. See, e.g., F.C. DeCoste, The Halpern Transformation: Same-Sex Marriage, Civil Society,
and the Limits of Liberal Law, 41 ALTA. L. REV. 619, 621–28, 633–35 (2003).
73. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 161 (1986); see DeCoste, supra note 72, at
635.
74. Hernandez, 805 N.Y.S.2d at 378 (Saxe, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 379 ("It is therefore unassailable that the due process clause of New York's
Constitution, like the Federal Constitution, protects, as fundamental, the right to marry, and
more particularly, to marry the person of one's choosing.").
76. Seana Sugrue, Soft Despotism and Same-Sex Marriage, in THE MEANING OF
MARRIAGE: FAMILY, STATE, MARKET, & MORALS 172, 173, 175 (Robert P. George & Jean B.
Elshtain eds., 2006) [hereinafter THE MEANING OF MARRIAGE]. Locke defined conjugal society
as follows:
[Conjugal society] is made by a voluntary compact between man and woman; and
though it consist[s] chiefly in such a communion and right in one another's bodies, as
is necessary to its chief end, procreation; yet it draws with it mutual support, and
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society as one of those “forms of social order the existence of which
are independent of the state.” He used the term, “pre-political social
77
order.” Indeed, “Locke’s political philosophy . . . does have the merit
of being of historical importance [relative to American constitutions,
as recognized by the AD dissenting opinion] and of stipulating clearly
that rights and responsibilities, including those pertaining to conjugal
78
society, are not created by the state” but are “[n]ormative
institutions . . . exist[ing] because they are compelling forms of social
order that advance basic human goods.”79 Thus, by invoking Locke in
the context of the “natural” or “fundamental” right to marry
(probably rightly), the AD dissenting opinion appears to be rather
unknowingly and effectively refuting its own opening words about a
state-created institution. This bizarre judicial performance may well
be explained by this insight: “Institutions of civil society are too often
ignored by judges and political theorists alike who tend to focus
almost exclusively on the state and its relation to individuals, as
though the state were the only desirable form of social order for the
advancement of human goods.”80
The AD dissenting opinion is probably doing even more than
refuting its own opening words; by invoking Locke, it is probably
laying well the foundation for rejection of its own ultimate
conclusion—that the court should redefine marriage from the union
of a man and a woman to the union of any two persons:
To function effectively, each of these [civil] institutions
[identified by Locke, including marriage and conjugal society]
requires the state to maintain a measure of respectful distance and
to uphold their core norms. There is no guarantee, however, that
the state will do so, and when it does not, the governance that
results in these spheres tends to range from the inept to the
despotic . . . .

assistance, and a communion of interest too, as necessary not only to unite their care
and affection; but also necessary to their common offspring, who have a right to be
nourished and maintained by them, till they are able to provide for themselves.
JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 47 (R. Cox ed., Harlan Davidson, Inc.
1982) (1690).
77. Sugrue, supra note 76, at 176.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 173–74.
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As marriage is a normative institution, the move to redefine it by
erasing one of its constitutive norms is a potent attack, one that
can be expected to have long-term and far-reaching consequences.
By taking upon itself the power to change the definition of
marriage, the state, through judicial action, is effectively
dismantling the connection between marriage and family. The state
gains power through this move, while the family, and its most
81
defenseless members, our children, lose their bearings.
[Each case mandating genderless marriage] makes of marriage a
legal form. That is, by putting aside both the history of the
institution and its place and meaning in ordinary moral and social
commerce, the Court reduces marriage entirely to law. With this,
marriage is not only fully politicized, but, in a very real sense,
becomes territory conquered by state law. This conquest comes at
a very great cost, both for liberty and for the plurality that is its
82
test and expression.

IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS DISSENTING OPINION AND ITS
ELISIONS
As with the majority in Hernandez AD, the majority in Hernandez
COA acknowledged key aspects of the social institutional argument,
again primarily by citation to and approving quotation from83 Justice
Cordy’s articulation of the argument in Goodridge.84 And, as with the
AD dissenting opinion, the COA dissenting opinion fails to engage
that argument but rather proceeds as if oblivious to the social
institutional realities demonstrated by it. In so doing, the COA
dissenting opinion both repeats some of the AD dissenting opinion’s
elisions and deploys elisions not seen there.
A. Repeating Elisions
The COA dissenting opinion uses the “close personal
relationship” component of the “convenient false assumption” elision,
and does so in connection with its use of the “evolving social

81. Id. at 174–75 (emphasis added); see DeCoste, supra note 72, at 632–37.
82. DeCoste, supra note 72, at 639–40.
83. Hernandez v. Robles, No. 86, 2006 WL 1835429, at *13–14 (N.Y. July 6, 2006) (Graffeo,
J., concurring).
84. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 995–96 (Mass. 2003) (Cordy, J.,
dissenting).
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institution” counter. Even more baldly than does the AD dissenting
opinion, the COA dissenting opinion asserts that marriage is nothing
more than the close personal relationship model. “Only since the midtwentieth century has the institution of marriage come to be
understood as a relationship between two equal partners, founded
upon shared intimacy and mutual financial and emotional support.”85
But, as already shown, that proffered description of the contemporary
American marriage institution is so incomplete as to be
fundamentally false.86 Thus, the same criticism fairly leveled at the AD
dissenting opinion’s use of this elision applies with at least equal force
87
to the COA dissenting opinion’s similar performance.
The same can be said of the COA dissenting opinion’s use of the
related “evolving social institution” counter. That opinion says that
“the common understanding of ‘marriage’ has changed dramatically
over the centuries . . . .”88 But like the AD dissenting opinion, the
COA dissenting opinion fails to show either that the “evolution” has
removed the constitutive meaning of “the union of a man and a
woman” from the contemporary marriage institution so that the law’s
89
task is simply to “adjust accordingly” or that the change not yet (and
maybe never to be) chosen or “evolved” by society is so wise that a
court ought to impose it on society by no less than the force of
“constitutional” law. Indeed, the COA dissenting opinion does not
even attempt either intellectual task; this aspect of its judicial
performance is thus rather woefully deficient.
B. The “Armless Stick-Figure” Elision
Perhaps nowhere does the COA dissenting opinion elide the
social institutional realities of marriage more than in its discussion of
the due process/fundamental right issue.
Federal and state courts have long recognized as “fundamental”
the right of a person to participate in the man/woman marriage

85. Hernandez, 2006 WL 1865429, at *17 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting).
86. See supra section III.A.
87. See supra section III.A.
88. Hernandez, 2006 WL 1865429, at *17 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting).
89. Hernandez, 805 N.Y.S.2d at 381 (Saxe, J., dissenting) ("As the institution of marriage
has been redefined within modern American society, the law has adjusted accordingly.").
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90

institution, and that is how the majority of the Court of Appeals saw
that right.91 On that basis, and because our society has never
recognized a personal right to enter—and a corresponding
governmental duty to create and sustain—the genderless marriage
institution, the majority held that no such personal right exists.92
The COA dissenting opinion’s simple but startling tactic relative
to this issue was to ignore or otherwise cast aside all aspects of the
fundamental right to enter the man/woman marriage institution
except the one sliver that can apply to same-sex couples: “Central to
93
the right to marry is the right to marry the person of one’s choice.”
That “central” aspect of the right then quickly became, in the
opinion’s treatment, the only aspect.94
Any defensible analysis of a “right to marry” must address what
marriage is. Otherwise the right has no external or objective referent;
it becomes nothing other than a purely personal construct, one freefloating form among others in a solipsistic vision of the universe. And
as to what marriage is, the majority proceeded on the uncontroversial
understanding that marriage is a vital social institution that, like all
social institutions, is constituted by a web of shared public meanings.
For the marriage institution, one of these core meanings is “the union
of a man and a woman,” with that meaning being uniquely productive
of a variety of valuable social goods mostly centered in the creation
and rearing of children.
The binary nature of marriage—its inclusion of one woman and
one man—reflects the biological fact that human procreation cannot
be accomplished without the genetic contribution of both a male and
a female. Marriage creates a supportive environment for procreation
to occur and the resulting offspring to be nurtured. Although
plaintiffs suggest that the connection between procreation and
marriage has become anachronistic because of scientific advances in
assisted reproduction technology, the fact remains that the vast

90. E.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12
(1967); Cooper v. Morin, 399 N.E.2d 1188, 1194 (N.Y. 1979).
91. Hernandez, 2006 WL 1865429, at *4–5; id. at *8–11 (Graffeo, J., concurring).
92. Id.
93. Id. at *15 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting).
94. Id. at *15–17.
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majority of children are conceived naturally through sexual contact
95
between a woman and a man.
In contrast, the dissent proceeded on the notion that marriage is
nothing other than state sanction of an intensely personal adult desire
96
and choice to bond to another adult. In an effort to support this
childless take on the nature of marriage, the dissent said that “the
protections that the State gives to couples who do marry—such as the
right to own property as a unit or to make medical decisions for each
other—are focused largely on the adult relationship, rather than on
97
the couple’s possible role as parents.” But that assertion is
problematic; it simply does not follow that legal recognition of
familial property and familial responsibility for health care is
unconnected to the great human endeavor of child-begetting and
child-rearing, an endeavor undertaken by a substantial majority of
adult Americans.98 This problem with the dissent’s approach is actually
just a small part of what is the larger problem of the entire genderless
marriage project. That project simply cannot, by any means, get past
the uncontroversial social institutional reality that societies across
cultures and millennia—including contemporary American society,
limited enclaves excepted—have sustained the man/woman marriage
institution in large measure because it effectively connects a man and
a woman and the children resulting from their passionate coupling in
ways (many unique) that well perpetuate not just the species but the
society itself, including all its valuable social institutions.99

95. Id. at *9 (Graffeo, J., concurring).
96. Hernandez, 2006 WL 1865429, at *14 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting) (speaking of how the
same-sex couple plaintiffs "grew up hoping to find that one person with whom they would share
their future, eager to express their mutual lifetime pledge through civil marriage.").
97. Id. at *21.
98. Jane Lawler Dye, Fertility of American Women: June 2004, CURRENT POPULATION
REPORTS P20-555 (U.S. Census Bureau Dec. 2005); Suzanne M. Bianchi & Lynne M. Casper,
American Families, Population Bull. 55(4), 18 (2000).
99. See, e.g., Don Browning & Elizabeth Marquardt, What About the Children? Liberal
Cautions on Same-Sex Marriage, in THE MEANING OF MARRIAGE, supra note 76, at 29–
52; Maggie Gallagher, (How) Does Marriage Protect Child Well-Being?, in THE MEANING
OF MARRIAGE, supra note 76, at 197–212; W. Bradford Wilcox, Suffer the Little Children:
Marriage, the Poor, and the Commonwealth, in THE MEANING OF MARRIAGE, supra note
76, at 242–54; Katherine K. Young & Paul Nathanson, The Future of an Experiment, in
DIVORCING MARRIAGE, supra note 4, at 41–62; Somerville, supra note 11, at 63–78;
Maggie Gallagher, (How) Will Gay Marriage Weaken Marriage as a Social Institution: A Reply
to Andrew Koppelman, 2 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 33, 45 (2004) ("Marriage is a virtually universal
social institution. . . . [M]arriage [everywhere] has something to do with bringing together a man
and a woman into a public—not merely private—sexual union, in which the rights and
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So when analyzing “a right to marry,” and therefore necessarily
considering what marriage is, the majority does a rather good job of
depicting the institution while the dissent clearly does not, exactly
100
because it elides institutional realities. It is as if, when requested to
represent the human form, one responds by bringing forth
Michelangelo’s David and another responds with an armless stickfigure drawing.
C. The “Child Welfare” Elision
The COA dissenting opinion attempts to characterize the “state
interest” in man/woman marriage as “mandating” or “encouraging” or
101
“promoting” procreation. Here, the opinion is merely deploying the
same tactic used in the Canadian and Massachusetts cases ordering
genderless marriage but since discredited.
[Those] cases elide the States’ argument from one premised on
marriage as society’s mechanism for the regulation and
amelioration of the consequences of passionate and procreative
heterosexual intercourse (children) to one premised on the silly
view of marriage as a mechanism mandating procreation. [Those]
majority opinions do not acknowledge the elision and,
consequently, do not seek to justify it, and no justification
102
independently presents itself.

responsibilities of the husband and wife towards each other and any children their sexual union
produces are publicly—not privately—defined and enforced."); Maggie Gallagher, Does Sex
Make Babies? Marriage, Same-Sex Marriage and Legal Justifications for the Regulation of
Intimacy in a Post-Lawrence World, 23 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 447, 451–71 (2004); Maggie
Gallagher, Rites, Rights, and Social Institutions: Why and How Should the Law Support
Marriage?, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 225, 231–34 (2004); Maggie Gallagher,
What Is Marriage For? The Public Purposes of Marriage Law, 62 LA. L. REV. 773, 781–91
(2002).
Likewise, the genderless marriage project cannot get past the uncontroversial social
institutional reality that a society cannot have both—but must choose between—the childcentered man/woman marriage institution and the adult-centered genderless marriage
institution. See Stewart, supra note 3, at 24–26.
100. The COA dissenting opinion sets up and knocks down a straw man when it asserts that
the man/woman meaning in marriage is a mere legal, artificial definition that, because
invidiously discriminatory, cannot be allowed to preclude any longer same-sex couples from
marrying. Hernandez, 2006 WL 1865429, at *17 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting). The social institutional
argument for man/woman marriage does not include or advance any notion of "definitional
preclusion"; rather, it demonstrates the essential bond between the man/woman meaning and
the marriage institution's nature, purposes, and social goods. See Stewart, supra note 3, at 15–24.
101. Hernandez, 2006 WL 1865429, at *20–21 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting).
102. Stewart, supra note 34, at 62.
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The COA dissenting opinion’s use of this particular elision is
doubly troubling in light of the fact that the majority in Hernandez
COA clearly articulated society’s genuine interest not to mandate or
even necessarily to encourage procreation but to provide support to
the social institution that best ameliorates the consequences of
procreation resulting from passionate heterosexual coupling.103
A closely related elision seen in the COA dissenting opinion is
this: It ignores one government endeavor relevant to marriage and
speaks only of a much different one. Those two different
governmental endeavors are, on one hand, sustaining the childcentered and child-protective social institution of man/woman
marriage and, on the other hand, assuring equal legal benefits to all
children, regardless of who heads their domicile. Here is how the
COA dissenting opinion ignores the former and speaks as if only the
latter advances legitimate societal interests:
The State plainly has a legitimate interest in the welfare of
children, but excluding same-sex couples from marriage in no way
furthers this interest. In fact, it undermines it. Civil marriage
provides tangible legal protections and economic benefits to
married couples and their children, and tens of thousands of
children are currently being raised by same-sex couples in New
York. Depriving these children of the benefits and protections
available to the children of opposite-sex couples is antithetical to
their welfare . . . . The State’s interest in a stable society is
rationally advanced when families are established and remain
104
intact irrespective of the gender of the spouses.

But this analysis is valid, of course, only to the extent that
sustaining the child-centered and child-protective institution of
man/woman marriage is the same governmental endeavor as
protecting “the welfare of children” (as the dissenting opinion uses
that concept). This is not at all clear. Reflection suggests that the two
endeavors are substantially different. Protecting the present welfare
of individual children found in varying circumstances is, in the way the
COA dissenting opinion addresses it, the provision of legal benefits to
individuals (or their care-takers). By contrast, sustaining man/woman
marriage entails the protection and perpetuation of a social

103. Hernandez, 2006 WL 1865429, at *2–4; id. at *13–14 (Graffeo, J., concurring).
104. Id. at *21 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting).
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institution—which benefits, both now and in the generations to come,
the children resulting from passionate, procreative heterosexual
coupling, the vast majority of all children. Thus understood, the two
different governmental protective endeavors are just that, different.
The COA dissenting opinion disappoints in that it provides no
demonstration of the equivalency or overlap of the two endeavors
and thus provides no justification for its refusal to acknowledge and
give due weight to the institution-protecting endeavor.105
D. The “Over/Under-Inclusive” Elision
The COA dissenting opinion elides other social institutional
realities when it invokes and attempts to apply the venerable
“over/under-inclusive” doctrine of equal protection jurisprudence.106
One elided reality is the connection between the man/woman
meaning now constitutive of the marriage institution and the valuable
social goods produced by that meaning. To acknowledge that reality is
to acknowledge that the “fit” between the impugned meaning and the
societal objective (those very social goods)—rather than being underor over-inclusive—is quite precise indeed. After all, to suppress that
meaning is to lose those goods; certainly the “any two persons”
meaning will not produce them.107
Another elided reality is this: a society can have at any one time
only the man/woman marriage institution or the genderless marriage
institution or no normative marriage institution at all. For the Court
of Appeals, the choice was actually between the two presently
possible
normative
marriage
institutions—man/woman
or
genderless—because
no
party
was
calling
for
the
deinstitutionalization of marriage. The court’s task thus does not seem
well-defined as determining whether a hypothetical and more
narrowly- or broadly-drawn statutory scheme better “fits” or “suits”
or “serves” a specific statutory objective than does the impugned
statute. In other words, the judicial task was little akin to sorting
through the gender discrimination in a statute allowing females to

105. See Stewart, supra note 3, at 37–38.
106. Hernandez, 2006 WL 1865429, at *20–21 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting). A good treatment of
the doctrine is R. Randall Kelso, Considerations of Legislative Fit Under Equal Protection,
Substantive Due Process, and Free Speech Doctrine: Separating Questions of Advancement,
Relationship, and Burden, 28 U. RICH. L. REV. 1279 (1994).
107. See Stewart, supra note 3, at 15–24.
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108
drink beer at age 18 while setting the age for males at 21 or to
evaluating the line-drawing in a statute that required local franchising
of antenna and television facilities, but not other private facilities that
109
also used no public rights-of-way. Rather, the Court of Appeals’ task
was either to mandate the genderless marriage institution by force of
“constitutional” law, and thereby necessarily suppress the man/woman
marriage institution, or to leave it to democratic processes to choose
one or the other of the two marriage institutions. Seen in this light—a
stark choice between one marriage institution and its unique social
goods and a radically different marriage institution and its (promised)
social goods—the over/under-inclusive doctrine seems ill-suited to the
judicial task really at hand.

E. The Racial Analogy and Institutional Realities
Both the COA dissenting opinion and the AD dissenting opinion
deployed repeatedly the argument of the racial analogy, also known
as the argument of the Perez/Loving analogy.110 The argument of the
Perez/Loving analogy, in its simplest form, goes like this: Because it is
unconstitutional (as unequal and unfair) to prevent a black from
marrying a white, it is likewise unconstitutional to prevent a man from
marrying a man or a woman from marrying a woman. But in
deploying that argument, both dissenting opinions proceeded
apparently oblivious to certain social institutional realities implicated
by their use of the Perez/Loving analogy.
Because marriage is a vital social institution, it performs an
important educative and socializing function. As seen, in its sphere the
marriage institution shapes and guides individuals’ identities,
perceptions, aspirations, and conduct, including what they believe to
be important and what they strive to achieve. But exactly because
marriage has a powerful educative role in our society—a power
reinforced by the supporting law’s authoritative voice—the marriage
institution is a tempting target for those seeking to advance the

108. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
109. F.C.C. v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 (1993).
110. Hernandez, 805 N.Y.S.2d at 379–81, 381 n.3, 382 (Saxe, J., dissenting); Hernandez, 2006
WL 1865429, at *16–17, 20 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting). In 1948, the California Supreme Court, in
Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948), led the way for the nation by holding that statutory
prohibitions of interracial marriages violated constitutional protections of equality. Then, in
1967, the United States Supreme Court, in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), held the same.
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sociopolitical purposes of an ideology unrelated to marriage. If those
so seeking can appropriate the institution and bend it to their
purposes, they have gone far in assuring the triumph of their agenda.
In the American past, two social movements temporarily
succeeded in using marriage as a means to achieve ulterior ends: the
white supremacist movement and the eugenics movement.111 In fact,
the anti-miscegenation laws were often found in the same legislative
package as the laws calling for the sterilization of “idiots” and other
so-called “genetic undesirables.”112 Central to the white supremacists’
project was the alteration of the core meaning of marriage from the
union of a man and a woman to the union of a man and a woman of
the same “race.”113 Laws that prohibited blacks from marrying whites
were an ugly feature grafted onto the marriage institution—the very
logic of which makes the graft a foreign object.114 The voice of those
laws, however, greatly magnified by social institutional power, subtly
but effectively inculcated throughout society the core dogma of white
supremacy. The courts that gave us the Perez and Loving decisions
apprehended the white supremacists’ marriage project for what it was
and rightly used constitutional equality norms to dismantle it.115 In the
process, those courts restored to marriage the integrity of its
institutional purposes and logic, a historic accomplishment.116
Substantial evidence supports the understanding that a primary
goal of the gay/lesbian rights movement’s genderless marriage project,
like that of the white supremacists, is to appropriate the institution
and change it to achieve sociopolitical purposes unrelated to
marriage.117 Again, that change entails an alteration in a core,
constitutive meaning—from the union of a man and a woman to the
union of any two persons. Granted that the respective objectives of
the old and the new marriage projects are very different, still the
projects in their appropriative strategy are of a kind.

111. Monte Neil Stewart & William C. Duncan, Marriage and the Betrayal of Perez and
Loving, 2005 BYU L. REV. 555, 557, 567–70.
112. Id. at 567–70.
113. Id.
114. The common law had no racial restrictions relative to marriage. Id. at 567.
115. Id. at 570–75.
116. Id. at 575.
117. Id. at 581–88.
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Thus, because Perez and Loving refused to allow the marriage
institution to be appropriated for nonmarriage ends, to use those two
cases to advance just such an appropriative project is to betray them.
In other words, the Perez/Loving argument advances a superficial
analogy that masks a deep disanalogy. That disanalogy is between the
intention of Perez and Loving to protect marriage from appropriation
for nonmarriage purposes and the intention of the present marriage
project to make such an appropriation. Thus, those who deploy the
Perez/Loving argument, whether advocates or judges, are misleading
118
people, including perhaps themselves.
Nor is this betrayal cured by an appeal to Perez’s and Loving’s
vindication of constitutional equality norms—that is, by the argument
that whereas the white supremacist marriage project fostered
inequality by the exclusiveness of the antimiscegenation laws, the new
marriage project fosters equality by the inclusiveness of its different
redefinition of marriage. This, of course, is an argument that the ends
justify the means, but the argument steadfastly ignores certain social
institutional realities regarding those means. As already seen, one
such reality is that an institution constituted by the core meaning of
“the union of any two persons” is not a modification of the marriage
119
institution but a radically different alternative to it. And, as also
already seen, another reality is that, backed by the force of
constitutional law, the new institution will, in not many years, displace
and, in that fashion, destroy (deinstitutionalize) the old institution.
For it is clear that society cannot, at one and the same time, tell the
people (and especially the children) that marriage, in its core
meaning, is the union of any two persons and that marriage, in its core
meaning, is the union of a man and a woman.120 The final institutional
reality is that when the man/woman marriage institution goes, its
array of valuable and unique social goods goes also.121
Thus, the pressing question with respect to the dissenting
opinions’ use of the argument from the Perez/Loving analogy is
whether an “equality” enshrined at such a cost to human development
and social welfare is indeed the equality vindicated by Perez and
Loving or otherwise demanded by our constitutional norms. The
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 558.
See supra section II.
Id.
Id.
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dissenting opinions provide no answer, again because they elide
rather than engage the social institutional realities relative to
122
marriage. The correct answer is rather clearly “no.”
V. CONCLUSION
Both the AD dissenting opinion and the COA dissenting opinion
failed to engage the social institutional argument for man/woman
marriage. Indeed, those opinions repeatedly proceeded on the basis of
assumptions or assertions regarding the contemporary American
marriage institution that are unsupported in the opinions themselves
and, more seriously, that stand contradicted by recent and clearly
observable social phenomena. The AD dissenting opinion erred
materially when it denied that “the union of a man and a woman”
continues as a shared public meaning at the core and constitutive of
the institution, when it stated that the man/woman meaning is not
productive of valuable social goods, and when it asserted that
replacement of that meaning with “the union of any two persons” will
result in an unchanged marriage institution and therefore in no
“down-side” to society. Moreover, the AD dissenting opinion’s own
references to John Locke’s influential writings on government and
society materially undercut the opinion’s ultimate conclusion in favor
of judicially-mandated genderless marriage. The COA dissenting
opinion, when the judicial task relative to a fundamental right to
marry called for an adequate description of what marriage is, gave the
equivalent of an armless stick-figure drawing. That opinion in its
treatment of the welfare of children also elided society’s, and hence
government’s, important institution-protective endeavor and elided,
in its use of the over/under-inclusive doctrine, the precise fit between
the man/woman meaning and the resulting valuable social goods that
continue to generate such broad societal support for the man/woman
marriage institution.123 Finally, a fair assessment of the social
institutional realities relative to marriage rather thoroughly discredits
both dissenting opinions’ use of the argument from the Perez/Loving
analogy.

122. Stewart & Duncan, supra note 111, at 588–95.
123. Regarding that broad societal support, see supra notes 43–46 and accompanying text.

